This paper examines the determinants of commercialization strategy for start-up innovators. We examine whether the returns on innovation are earned through product market competition as opposed to cooperation with more established firms (either through licensing, strategic alliances or outright acquisition). Our key hypotheses are that the relative returns to cooperation are increasing in (a) the control of intellectual property rights, (b) low transaction costs and (c) the cost of the sunk assets associated with product market entry. We find support for these ideas using a novel dataset of the commercialization strategies of start-up innovators. The results suggest that the procompetitive benefits of start-up innovation -the gale of creative destruction -depends on the severity of imperfections in the "market for ideas." Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: L10, L14, O31 and O32.
Introduction
Over the past decade, there has been a rapid rise in the level of investment funding provided to technology-oriented start-up firms. Venture capital investments increased by more than an order of magnitude between 1991 (VentureOne, 2000 , and venture-backed firms currently account for more than 15% of all domestic industrial innovation (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . Not surprisingly, there is considerable interest in the economic implications of this surge in R&D investment in start-up firms (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Hellman and Puri, 2000) .
Many analysts suggest that start-up innovation impacts existing sources of market power by spurring the "gale of creative destruction" (Schumpeter, 1943; Christensen, 1997) . However, industry studies suggest a more nuanced relationship (Gans and Stern, 2001 ). For example, in the biotechnology industry, cooperation between start-up innovators and more established firms is the norm (whether through licensing, strategic alliances or outright acquisition) (Orsenegio, 1989; Lerner and Merges, 1998) . On the other hand, start-up innovators in the electronics industry often engage in creative destruction, earning their innovation rents through product market entry and competition with more established firms (Christensen, 1997) . This paper attempts to understand these different patterns by evaluating how economic factors such as the strength of intellectual property protection shape the relative returns to cooperation versus competition.
Consider a cooperation strategy. Start-up innovators and more established firms share (at least) two distinct gains from trade in the "market for ideas": (1) preserving current market power and (2) avoiding duplicative commercialization investments, such as those associated with distribution, manufacturing, or a branded reputation. If an ideas market functions efficiently, incumbents can contract for innovations from start-ups (who then serve as technology suppliers) and so foreclose on a potentially important form of competition. Imperfections in the market for ideas, conversely, can spur a competitive strategy by start-up innovators.
We identify three key factors shaping start-up commercialization strategy. First, in the absence of completely enforceable intellectual property rights (IPR), start-up commercialization strategy will be responsive to the threat of expropriation (Arrow, 1962; Anton and Yao, 1994) . The threat of expropriation is present whether a start-up competes or cooperates. Under competition, incumbent firms will attempt to reverseengineer; in the context of cooperation, the start-up will likely disclose technical information to the established firm, weakening its bargaining position. Therefore, regardless of their commercialization strategy, an increase in the strength of IPR increases the absolute expected returns to start-up innovators. However, under cooperation, the overall (negotiated) returns to a start-up innovator reflects both the value of their proprietary knowledge as well as their ability to threaten the established firm with competitive entry. The combination of these two effects makes the payoffs to cooperation more sensitive to the strength of IPR than the payoffs to competition.
Therefore, a given increase in the strength of IPR increases the relative returns to cooperation over competition.
Second, identifying and contracting with incumbents may involve substantial transaction costs. Even when IPR are well defined, there may be uncertainty about the value (or other characteristics) of the start-up technology; this uncertainty may necessitate detailed bargaining between the parties about royalty rates and other contingent contracting provisions (Arora, Fosfuri, and Gambardella, 1999) . As such, bargaining intermediaries that substantially reduce the cost of forging an agreement between the parties, such as venture capitalists or specialized legal counsel, may increase the relative likelihood of cooperation (Burt, 1992) .
Finally, cooperation allows start-up innovators to exploit "complementary assets" controlled by incumbents, including distribution channels, regulatory or manufacturing expertise, and brand-name recognition (Teece, 1986) . While avoiding duplication of sunk assets is important in some environments (such as when biotechnology firms exploit the regulatory expertise and distribution channels of established pharmaceutical companies), incumbent-owned assets confer minimal value in other settings (e.g., when start-ups develop incompatible technology). As the "cost" of product market entry increases, start-up innovators will be more likely to forego competition and earn their returns through the market for ideas. This paper empirically evaluates whether commercialization strategy differs with measures capturing variation along these three dimensions -the strength of intellectual property, the cost of contracting, and the importance and effectiveness of complementary asset ownership. Perhaps surprisingly, little empirical work has been devoted to this topic. Most prior analyses of the relationship between start-up and established firms have tended to focus on the relative incentives to innovate in the first place, under the assumption that innovation by a start-up will be followed by product market competition with more established firms.
1 As well, several analyses have examined the form of 1 The literature on R&D and product market competition between incumbents and start-up firms is too large to be summarized here. See Cohen and Levin (1989) or Gans and Stern (2000a) for a review.
cooperation between smaller research-oriented firms and larger established firms without considering the potential for product market entry. 2 By relating the choice between cooperation and competition to the firm's economic environment, our analysis suggests that the competitive consequences of start-up innovation are endogenous to the commercialization environment. Specifically, the industrial organization consequences of the start-up financing boom depends on factors such as the strength of IPR and the availability of venture capital. In turn, these commercialization environment parameters depend, at least in part, on various aspects of public policy.
We report empirical results using a dataset composed of the commercialization strategies of 118 projects. We evaluate whether cooperation is associated with (a) innovations that receive formal IP protection (e.g., a patent), (b) firms with access to a network of contacts (e.g., through a relationship with a venture capitalist), and (c) environments where ownership of complementary assets by the start-up is perceived as ineffective in earning profits from innovation. We find that each factor is associated with a quantitatively significant effect on the probability of cooperation. For example, firms that possess IPR are estimated to be 23 percentage points more likely than non-patentholders to pursue a cooperative strategy. While the impact of IPR is estimated relatively precisely, the estimates of the impact of venture capitalists and the costs of complementary assets are noisier (occasionally these factors are only significant at the 10% level). These core empirical findings are robust to the inclusion of a variety of controls, varying the definitions of each of our empirical concepts, and relying exclusively on within-industry or cross-industry variation. While we interpret this evidence cautiously given the small size of our sample and our imperfect measures of the concepts underlying the theoretical model, our findings do accord with a simple but novel model of strategic interaction between start-up innovators and incumbents in hightechnology industries.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops a simple model of start-up commercialization strategy. After a brief review of our data, the empirical results are presented in Section IV. A final section concludes.
II. A Simple Model of Start-Up Commercialization Strategy
This section presents a simple model identifying the key comparative statics associated with start-up commercialization strategy. 3 Most notably, though an increase in IPR increases the absolute returns to both competition and cooperation, the fact that bargaining takes place in the "shadow" of potential product market competition raises the relative payoff to cooperation.
Consider a start-up innovator, E, who has successfully developed a commercializable innovation. 4 E faces a choice between entering the product marketthe competitive strategy -or "selling" the innovation to an incumbent, I -the cooperative strategy. A cooperative strategy may be achieved through several mechanisms (from a licensing agreement to a strategic alliance to acquisition of E by I). While these 3 While our model examines strategic interaction between a start-up innovator and a single incumbent, the underlying economic forces are more general. A more inclusive treatment would consider the possibility of non-exclusive cooperative behavior in the context of a pre-existing oligopoly (e.g., through non-exclusive licensing), distinguish more carefully between different types of cooperative strategies (e.g., between licensing, strategic alliances, or outright acquisition), and consider conduct between firms in the case of competition. Our approach simply highlights the key testable economic predictions for the commercialization choices of start-up innovators. 4 A commercializable innovation is one in which all technological uncertainty has been resolved (e.g., a prototype exists) and so, with (known) investments, the innovation could be introduced into the market. mechanisms differ in how they impact future incentives to innovate and the locus of decision authority, they share a common feature: if an agreement is reached, I forecloses on product market competition with E and maintains monopoly profits. Monopoly profits are denoted m π , while E and I both earn c π under the competitive strategy.
Under either strategy, commercialization involves sunk costs for the start-up firm.
To compete in the product market, E must invest K in order to create the assets to produce, market and distribute its innovation. Undertaking the cooperative strategy also involves an upfront transaction cost, c, associated with bargaining with I in the market for ideas. Since these costs are irreversible, E compares expected profits associated with each path in choosing its commercialization strategy. Figure A illustrates the model. Note that regardless of which strategy it pursues, E faces a risk that I imitates the innovation. If E does choose to compete, I may imitate E's innovation (i.e., "reverse-engineer") with probability 1-p r , but, with probability θ, E successfully enforces its IPR. Therefore, with probability (1)(1) r p θ −−, I can commercialize an imitative technology. For simplicity, we assume that successful commercial imitation by I raises I's profits by ∆ and reduces E's by a similar amount, leaving industry profits unchanged.
5 By choosing to compete, E earns expected profits of (1)(1) c r pK πθ −∆−−−, which are increasing in the strength of IPR (θ).
Under the cooperative strategy, E's return is determined through the outcome of a bargaining game with I. This bargaining game involves a potential "expropriation" hazard, since negotiating over the sale of an idea inevitably involves the risk of disclosure 5 Of course, expropriation may also change the level of industry profits. We are not aware of a complete treatment of how changes in product market rents arising from imitation impact optimal commercialization strategy. However, several models (available upon request) suggest that as long as imitation does not of that idea to the potential buyer, obviating the buyer's willingness-to-pay (Arrow, 1962) . To capture the expropriation risk, we assume that when E negotiates with I, I can imitate the innovation with probability 1-p d , but as in the competition setting, E can enforce its IPR with probability θ. For notational simplicity, we assume that θ governs the strength of IPR under both the competition and cooperation strategies, 6 and that the impact of expropriation by I is to increase its potential product market profits by ∆ and reduce E's by a similar amount. As such, E faces a risk, with probability (1-θ)( The possibility of expropriation impacts the expected outcome of negotiations between E and I. Allowing the bargaining outcome -that is, the transfer (τ) from I to Eto be determined by the Nash bargaining solution (as in Aghion and Tirole, 1994) , each party "splits" the gains from trade. E's profits in the absence of expropriation is equal to: On the other hand, expropriation by I reduces the share of the monopoly profits E expects to receive. Expropriation by I does not entirely eliminate E's rents since (a) E can still credibly threaten to reduce I's profits by competing in the product market (Anton and Yao, 1994; and (b) E may be able to enforce its IPR with probability θ. However, relative to payoffs in the absence of expropriation, disclosure increases I's potential decrease total industry profits too much, our comparative statics are unchanged. 6 Our comparative statics hold as long as the probability of enforcement under each regime is impacted similarly by changes in factors such as the ease and scope of patent protection or the availability of legal remedies against IP infringement. competitive position (and similarly decreases E's position). As such, using the same bargaining rule as above, E's share under expropriation, τ, will equate:
Since E chooses to cooperate as long as 11 22 (1)(1)(1)(1)(1) The impact of a change in the strength of IPR is subtler. Increases in IP protection improve the start-up's absolute returns to both the cooperative and competitive strategies. However, since the start-up's bargaining outcome is equal to its absolute return under competition plus a fraction of the surplus associated with cooperation, an increase in the strength of IPR (through an increase in θ or a decrease in ∆) increases the relative return to cooperation over competition. The probability of cooperation is increasing in the strength of IPR because the returns to cooperation depend on a bargaining process that internalizes E's ability to threaten I with competitive entry.
III. Data
The remainder of the paper evaluates the empirical salience of the predictions of this model. Our approach is straightforward (as in the spirit of Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981) . We evaluate how the cooperation probability of a sample of start-up innovators varies with observable characteristics of the commercialization environment.
We begin by reviewing the novel dataset employed in this study and discussing our empirical measures in some detail.
The Commercialization Strategies Survey
Our empirical approach requires measuring the commercialization environment and strategy, data that are unavailable from either public or commercial databases (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Hellman and Puri, 2000) . To address this challenge, we developed and administered a start-up commercialization strategy survey (found in the appendix) during the first half of 1999. The survey population is composed of start-ups receiving external R&D financing from one of two sources: private venture capital (VC) or the Small Business Innovation Research program (SBIR). Dividing the sample between SBIR and VC-funded firms incorporates variation in the costs of identifying and contracting with partners while maintaining the ability to evaluate the impact of IP strength and sunk costs across a cross-section of firms.
The sample consists of 63 SBIR-backed and 55 VC-backed firms (for a total of 118 observations).
8 Following Lerner (1999) , we use a "matching" process to identify commercialization strategy (Gans and Stern, 2000a) . 8 The overall survey response rate was approximately 50%. Non-responders seemed to be randomly mixed between firms not having a commercial product and those who declined for other reasons. The respondent was typically the director of R&D, sales or marketing, or the CEO. The surveys were first pre-tested with a small sample of potential respondents. Thereafter, we collected survey responses by phone, fax and mail.
the sample population in an effort to preserve within-sample consistency. First, we collected the sample of SBIR-funded projects (drawn from the top 200 SBIR award winners between 1990 and 1993) and then matched each SBIR project with a single VCbacked project. The matching criteria is based on each firms' four-digit SIC code, initial sales, and geographic location. 9 The key requirement for inclusion in the sample is that the firm successfully commercialized an externally-funded technology, either independently or through some form of cooperative agreement. This prerequisite ensures that our evaluation of commercialization strategy is conditioned on the fact that the innovation has been commercialized.
The projects are distributed across five SIC codes: biotechnology (2836), computer software (7372), industrial machinery and equipment (35), electronic equipment (36) and scientific instruments (38). We collected data on each firm's employees, promotion policies, corporate ownership and governance, as well as financial information including expenditures and revenues. For each project, we collected information about commercialization and financing history, revenue information including sales and licensing, the importance of the technology in achieving firm objectives, and the key personnel associated with the firm's commercialization strategy.
10
It is useful to compare the institutional features associated with the two sources of financing for firms in the sample. The SBIR program provides R&D grants to U.S. firms with 500 or fewer employees (USGAO, 1995) . The level of funding for the program by each Federal agency is equal to a fixed percentage of the total level of R&D funding for that agency. Grant applications are peer-reviewed and awarded through a competitive process (less than 15% of applications are granted). 11 Once awarded, the SBIR grant is a "hands-off" subsidy; the government neither takes over managerial control nor maintains an equity stake in funded organizations. Because it is administered through all R&D-performing Federal agencies, the SBIR program funds a diverse array of firms and technologies relative to the concentrated distribution of private VC financing (Gans and Stern, 2000b) . We ensure comparability by evaluating a sample drawn from five industrial segments heavily funded by both VCs and the SBIR program.
In contrast to the SBIR program, VCs provide capital to start-ups in exchange for equity and managerial control. In addition to their financial role, VCs are believed to aid start-up firms by offering a network of contacts and potential partners as well as providing experience in corporate governance (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Stuart, Hong and Hybels, 1999) . While SBIR and VC-funded projects differ insofar as VC funding directly affects the operation and decision rights of the firm, projects from either source are comparable in several key respects: (a) firms tend to be young, (b) the projects are R&D-intensive, (c) project selection is competitive and (d) the size of financing is comparable in the study period.
11 There are two award types. Phase I awards are proof of concept awards which, during the early 1990s, were capped at $100,000. Phase II awards are development-oriented and, were in the same time period, capped at $750,000 (USGAO, 1995). Our sample of SBIR firms has received Phase II awards. Grants are based, in principle, on three legislative goals: (a) increasing the commercialization rate of innovations derived from Federal R&D, (b) enhancing the "competitiveness" of small firms in technology-intensive sectors, and (c) increasing participation of underrepresented groups in Federal contracting (USGAO, 1995) . The policy rationale for the SBIR is a belief that entrepreneurial firms are highly productive, associated with high spillovers and potential R&D under-investment (Lerner, 1999) . However, the program's objectives and administration may conflict insofar as administrators may have incentives to grant funding to infra-marginal projects (Wallsten, 2000) .
Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics
Cooperation measures. (mean = .14). Together, LICENSED and ACQUIRED form a meaningful concept of cooperative behavior for firms within our sample. In Figure B , we plot the percentage of overall revenues derived from cooperation (either through licensing or equal to one if ACQUIRED). The histogram is bimodal; for over 80% of the sample, revenues are derived solely from either licensing/acquisition or from independent commercialization. Accordingly, our key measure of cooperation is COOP (LIC + ACQ), a dummy equal to one if either LICENSED or ACQUIRED is equal to one. It is interesting to note that there is substantial heterogeneity of COOP (LIC + ACQ) across industrial sectors. For example, while the probability of cooperation is above 50% in biotechnology, less than 25% of industrial equipment firms cooperate in commercialization.
We also explore alternative measures of cooperation. First, we explore differences between the determinants of LICENSED and ACQUIRED themselves. As well, building on a mostly descriptive literature highlighting the impact of strategic alliances on cooperative activity (Gomes-Casseres, 1996), we define HI ALLIANCES as a dummy variable equal to one for firms with a high level of strategic alliance activity (in 12 Over 95% of the technology licenses are assigned on an exclusive basis.
the top quintile). We also group HI ALLIANCES with our previous definition of COOP (LIC + ACQ) to form COOP (ALL) (mean = .41).
Commercialization environment measures.
Our analysis relates these cooperation measures to the following variables associated with the strength of IPR, the costs of transacting with potential partners, and the role of sunk cost asymmetries.
We measure the strength of intellectual property in several distinct ways. For most of our analysis, we focus on whether the start-up innovator has received at least one patent associated with the technology (PATENT THRESHOLD = 1). While the mean number of project-specific patents across firms is just over six, less than two-thirds of the sample firms possess at least one patent. To ensure that these measures reflect the commercialization environment at the time of the commercialization strategy choice, we are careful to check that the patents included in our sample are granted prior to the event of cooperation (either acquisition or the receipt of licensing revenues). In addition, we also have collected several more qualitative measures of the level of appropriability (in the spirit of Levin, et al. (1987) ). Specifically, we asked each firm to rank several appropriability strategies on a five-point Likert scale, including the importance of patents (PATENT LIKERT) and trade secrecy (SECRECY LIKERT).
By construction, the sample is (approximately) equally divided between exclusively VC-backed firms (VC = 1) and SBIR-funded firms (VC = 0). This contrast allows us to compare the commercialization strategies of firms who differ in terms of the relative costs of negotiating cooperative agreements with more established firms. While we use the VC dummy in most of the analysis, we also employ an alternative dummy measure, EVER VC-FINANCED, which groups together those firms for whom VC = 1 and those firms initially funded by the SBIR who received some form of venture financing by the end of 1999.
Measuring the investment costs that entrants face in acquiring complementary assets necessary for effective competitive commercialization (relative to the costs associated with a cooperative strategy) is extremely difficult, especially in a crossindustry study. Because "objective" measures of relative investment costs are elusive (a problem not confined to the current study), we developed a set of five point Likert scales for our survey. Respondents rated the "importance and effectiveness of control" over key assets in earning returns from their innovation: manufacturing, distribution channels, brand development, and servicing. Based on our discussions in field interviews, we believe that respondents rated the importance of each complementary asset element depending on their perception of the relative attractiveness and cost-effectiveness of ownership of that element.
The empirical analysis uses two measures summarizing these survey responses.
First, we defined CA LIKERT MAX as the maximum Likert score over the set of questions. The highest level of CA LIKERT MAX (i.e., CA LIKERT MAX = 5)
suggests that the respondent perceived that ownership of at least one of the complementary assets elements was cost-effective for earning profits from the innovation. As such, we define EXPENSIVE COMP ASSET OWNERSHIP as a dummy variable equal to one if CA LIKERT MAX is less than five. EXPENSIVE COMP ASSET OWNERSHIP = 1 reflects a perception by the respondent that ownership of relevant complementary assets would not be cost-effective relative to cooperation with pre-existing owners of those assets (mean = .32).
Firm-level control variables.
A benefit of our survey-based data collection method is our ability to collect detailed firm-and project-level controls for use in the empirical analysis. To control for differences across firms in their resources and capabilities, we measure the pre-innovation size of firms with categorical variables related to INITIAL EMPLOYEE SIZE (while the mean number of initial employees is 25, we group these data into four size categories in the empirical work as the impact of size may vary across its distribution). Two additional variables measure differences among firms in their overall commercialization orientation and strategy. PHD EMP SHARE is the share of firm employees with Ph.D. level training, and CEO FOUNDER is a dummy variable indicating whether the founder of the firm has remained the CEO.
Firms with a high PHD EMP SHARE might have specific objectives of avoiding direct entry into product markets, perhaps to maintain a "scientific" firm culture (Stern, 2000) , while the presence of a CEO-founder may be associated with the presence of "empirebuilding" motives (Roberts, 1991) .
Project-level control variables. We also define project-level controls to capture the timing and technological type of different innovations. TIME TO MARKET is the time in months from idea conception to first sale of the product. Projects requiring long development times, for example, might be commercialized more frequently via cooperation due to firm resource constraints. Furthermore, YEAR OF PRODUCT INTRO (the year in which a product is initially commercialized) may also impact commercialization strategy, perhaps because of random time-varying market effects.
Finally, the nature of the technological innovation may also influence the firm's cooperative behavior. For example, radical innovations may result in more competitive behavior (Reinganum, 1983; Henderson, 1993) . We include NOVEL SYSTEM INNOVATION and PRODUCT INNOVATION in the empirical analysis to control for the degree to which the innovation might be incompatible with the incumbent's current technology (for example, almost 40% of the innovations were recorded as "novel systems"). With this data overview in mind, we now turn to our analysis of how start-up commercialization strategy is impacted by the economic environment.
IV. Empirical Results
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we review pairwise and cross-industry correlations to highlight the basic facts present in the data. Second, we present regression estimates relating commercialization strategy to the commercialization environment, exploring various control structures and alternative measures of key variables. Finally, we disaggregate the form of cooperation by separating the determinants of licensing and acquisition to examine the sensitivity of the results to our definition of cooperation.
Our analysis begins in Table 2 which reports the pairwise conditional means of the probability that COOP (LIC + ACQ) = 1 and each of the three key variables. The results are striking. Changes in each of the (binary) commercialization environment measures are associated with over a 70% increase in the probability of cooperation, in the direction predicted by the model (each of these differences is statistically significant at the 5% level). For example, firms with at least one project-related patent are more than twice as likely to cooperate relative to those with no patents.
In addition, these variables relate to varying commercialization strategy choices across industrial sectors. The first panel of Figure C displays a scatter plot of the mean of project-level patenting for each industrial sector and the industry-specific probability of cooperation. Consistent with qualitative assessments of the differences across industries (Gans and Stern, 2001) , industries with higher levels of project-level patenting are more likely to pursue a cooperative commercialization strategy. The second panel of Figure C reports an analogous result for the industry-specific mean of EXPENSIVE COMP ASSET OWNERSHIP. The probability of cooperation is highest in segments such as biotechnology where the relative costs of acquiring complementary assets are particularly high. 13 While suggestive, these results do not control for project-and firm-level factors, and so we turn to a more systematic regression analysis. Table 3 presents the principal binary probit results. For each specification, the dependent variable is the dummy cooperation measure COOP (LIC + ACQ). Inclusion of all three commercialization environment measures without additional controls shows that each is associated with cooperation, even controlling for the other two (including any two of the three also yields similar results). In addition to their statistical significance (at 5%
for PATENT THRESHOLD, just below 5% for VC and EXPENSIVE COMP ASSET OWNERSHIP), the estimates in (3-1) suggest strong quantitative effects. A change in one of the three (indicator) variables at the means of the other variables is associated with a predicted change in the probability of cooperation by 23% (PATENT THRESHOLD),
17.3% (VC), and 18.4% (EXPENSIVE COMP ASSET OWNERSHIP).
So far, we have assumed that the commercialization environment variables are exogenous to the firm's commercialization strategy choice. While this seems reasonable for sunk asset costs associated with product market entry, the observed level of IPR and VC funding might be related to the firm's commercialization strategy. We, therefore, paid close attention to the sequence of commercialization events. Specifically, we checked that patent awards and external financing by VCs and the SBIR program preceded cooperation events. Of course, the sequencing of events does not make these variables predetermined, so the remainder of Table 3 exploits our detailed survey data to provide industry-, firm-, and project-level controls for omitted factors potentially correlated with commercialization strategy and the commercialization environment.
In (3-2), we include industry segment dummies, suggesting evidence for our key hypotheses in the within-industry variation of commercialization strategy. As well, the positive coefficient on BIOTECHNOLOGY suggests that some segments offer an extremely favorable environment for cooperation, above and beyond our commercialization environment measures.
We then turn to analyses addressing the chief "candidate" for potential bias: our inability to fully control for the underlying quality of projects. It is possible that PATENT THRESHOLD and VC-FUNDED are also associated with higher quality projects. We address this issue in three ways. First, we include several controls for the type of technology and the timing of product introduction (3-3). Neither the time from project conception to product introduction nor the type of technology impact commercialization strategy; as well, our commercialization environment results remain effectively unchanged. While these results are in contrast to the prior (mostly theoretical) literature highlighting the importance of the pro-competitive effects of "radical" technologies, we do not overemphasize these findings, as the type of innovation is selfreported by each firm. Our main point is simply that our core results are robust to Our results are therefore robust to the inclusion of measures of realized project quality.
Finally, conflating strong IPR or association with VCs with "high-quality" projects likely reduces the power of our empirical work to detect the impact of the commercialization environment. Suppose that control of IP (or association with VCs) is simply proxying for "high-quality" or "radical" projects. Most earlier research would then suggest that our measures of the commercialization environment would be associated with higher rates of independent product market entry (Foster, 1986; Christensen, 1997) , implying that our empirical work is providing a lower bound on the impact of the commercialization environment measures.
Additional potential sources of unobserved differences exist at the firm level.
Specifically, firms may differ in the resources available for commercialization or in their overall corporate strategy (beyond the specific project included in our sample). In (3-4), we include controls for initial firm size (divided into categories since preliminary empirical analysis suggested the relationship may be nonlinear). Interestingly, relative to firms with the largest initial sizes in our sample (the excluded category), smaller firms are not significantly more likely to cooperate (indeed, the estimates for each of the included categories is negative). In the final column of Table 3 , we include all of our prior controls together as well as two additional firm-level controls, CEO FOUNDER and PHD-TRAINED EMPS. In line with our other findings, the commercialization environment variables continue to have similar predicted effects on commercialization strategy, with little evidence that the composition of employees or ownership impacts the probability of cooperation.
By simultaneously including industry-, firm-, and project-level variables, we control for many potential sources of unobserved heterogeneity in the data. As well, we ran a wide number of additional specifications to establish robustness of the key results.
In addition, we experimented with an instrumental variables procedure where, for firm j, we instrument for PATENT THRESHOLD with the average, excluding firm j, of PATENTS and PATENT LIKERT in firm j's industry segment. While the results on the complementary asset variables tend to be reduced in significance, our results regarding the role of IPR and VC-FUNDED continue to be robust.
14 Taken together, we interpret these results as providing support for a model in which start-up innovators earn their returns on innovation through the market for ideas when the environment offers a strong intellectual property regime, and, at the same time, the start-up faces high relative costs in acquiring and controlling key complementary assets necessary for commercialization success. As imperfections arise in the market for ideas (e.g., through increases in the expropriation hazard), start-up innovators are more 14 We do not separately report these results since the essential empirical relationship is highlighted in Figure C (which suggests that the substantial cross-industry variation in the rate of cooperation is related to likely to pursue competitive strategies, which in turn contribute to the gale of creative destruction.
Alternative Measures. In Table 4 , we document the robustness of our core results to alternative measures of the key variables. This is particularly important in the context of exploring a novel dataset in which we had some latitude in defining the variables used in the analysis. In ( 
Form of Cooperation.
We conclude the empirical analysis by "unbundling" the COOP (LIC + ACQ) measure to explore whether an alternate definition alters our results. Table 5 shows the results of multinomial logits using a dependent variable of LICENSED or ACQUIRED (the default commercialization choice is "compete"). Disaggregating the dependent variable in this way yields additional insight into the nature of cooperation. In equation (5-1), note that licensing behavior is associated with the IPR and complementary asset regimes, whereas acquisitions are associated with VC funding. The final regression, (5-2), includes industry dummies, which do not alter the PATENT THRESHOLD or VC-FUNDED effects, but weakens the EXP. COMP ASSET OWNERSHIP result (to just below the 10% significance level). These results suggest that technology licenses depend importantly on the strength of intellectual property protection, and that VCs may help facilitate acquisition rather than licensing or competition activity.
comparability from Likert-based survey responses.
V. Discussion and Conclusions
In economic environments such as those observed in the biotechnology industry, where patents are relatively effective in protecting IPR, firms face high relative investment costs, and brokers are available to facilitate trade, start-up innovators tend to earn their returns from innovation through the market for ideas, acting as an upstream supplier of "technology" rather than as a horizontal innovation-oriented competitor. In contrast, when investment costs for the entrant are relatively low and the technological innovation is not protected by patents, as in the disk drive industry, the severe disclosure threat tends to foreclose the ideas market. Start-up innovators in this environment are more likely to commercialize their innovations through product market competition.
We found empirical support for these ideas using a novel sample of the commercialization strategies of 118 start-ups. Perhaps most strikingly, firms who control IPR are more likely to pursue a cooperative strategy. These results suggest that the role of intellectual property on the competitiveness of product markets is subtle. While most prior work has emphasized the fact that a strong intellectual property position increases the absolute returns to innovation, our evidence is consistent with a somewhat more nuanced idea -that increases in the strength of intellectual property increase the relative returns to cooperation by facilitating the market for ideas.
The study is not without limitations. First, the empirical measures may be imperfect in capturing the key concepts from the theoretical model. The results are robust, however, to alternative measures of both cooperation and the start-up's commercialization environment, increasing our confidence in the results. Second, our measures of the commercialization environment may be endogenous. We addressed this issue in two ways: (1) the sample was constructed so as to include only pre-existing patent and external funding events relative to cooperation events; and (2) we include detailed controls to limit the risk of omitting variables that may be correlated with both the start-up's commercialization strategy and its commercialization environment.
Finally, the control of IPR or association with VCs may be correlated with underlying project quality. Our results are, however, robust to controls for both the type and size of innovation. Indeed, cooperation is positively associated with a revenue-based measure of the realized commercial returns from the project. Whereas most earlier research assumes or suggests that product market entry and competition would be associated with projects with higher quality (Christensen, 1997) , our findings suggest that projects able to obtain IPR, funded by venture capitalists, and associated with higher revenues are all more likely to be commercialized through cooperation.
These findings suggest several directions for further research. First, we plan to investigate commercialization strategies for both entrants and incumbents in "mixed" economic environments. For example, in environments where IPR are weak and a dominant incumbent would prefer to take advantage of the R&D productivity of smaller firms, established firms may be motivated to develop a reputation for "nonexpropriation" in order to provide incentives for innovation and cooperation by start-ups.
Indeed, Gawer (2000) finds qualitative evidence for this hypothesis in the semiconductor industry. Second, our findings suggest that venture capitalists play a non-financial role in the strategy of start-up firms. Identifying the mechanisms by which VCs facilitate transactions and whether they earn additional economic returns by doing so remains an additional area for further investigation. Enclosed is a survey, which asks you to describe the circumstances surrounding a specific innovative project or initiative. We would like to focus on your firm's involvement in its main business area. Within that frame, please choose a research and/or development project which is internally perceived as an important source of value for your firm. We would like you to choose a project which provided direct financial returns for the firm, through direct sales, licensing agreements, or in strengthening the bargaining position of the firm.
Once the project is chosen, the survey is divided into two parts:
• 
